Fact Frames

People approach conflicts in very different ways, depending on their images of the relevant technical and social facts. For example, people who believe that air pollution is killing them can be expected to act differently from people who think that it is merely an unpleasant inconvenience. This section, which will link closely with the fact-finding section, will examine the psychological role of facts and factual interpretation.

All individuals use frames to aid in deciding where and how they fit into the conflict and what, if anything, they can do in response. Using the metaphor of a picture frame, the "frame" concept acts as a device to draw borders around what is and what is not important. Just as a picture frame defines what is and what is not included in a picture, fact frames define what is and what is not important to consider when evaluating information, data, or facts about a particular dispute or policy alternative.

The Importance of Fact Frames

Because nearly every important social conflict involves expert evaluation and opinion, the framing of these facts deserves closer analysis. Facts do not speak for themselves; without proper presentation and interpretation, facts can leave one uncertain as to the meaning and significance of the information. In many cases, preconceived notions of what is correct or incorrect, factual or biased, objective or subjective, can cloud accurate processing of relevant information. In addition, who is presenting the information can drastically influence how the information is perceived, regardless of content.

Framing for Information Producers and Users

Fact frames can be divided into two categories: those of the information producers (scientists, data analysts, technicians, engineers, professors, environmental risk assessment experts, etc.), and those of the information users (lay public, politicians, conflict resolution practitioners, educators, activists, policy-makers, etc.). Because of their different societal and institutional roles, each party will frame factual information in different ways.

Framing Problems

For information producers: Because of their relationship to the data collection process itself, information producers tend to frame the facts in specific ways. For example, since many experts are so involved and entrenched in the information production process, they often assume that all of the parties are aware of the practices and procedures associated with that process. This assumption can lead information producers to adopt an “expert only” frame, which makes it difficult to transmit the larger meaning or significance of the produced information to a broader audience. Since they know the minute details of the process used in the production of the information, they assume that everyone else knows (or should know), as well. Therefore, in their communication to others, they frame facts in ways that assume that everyone else knows what they know.

An additional problem is associated with trust and credibility. If experts frame information in ways that assume that everyone is knowledgeable about their work, they may omit essential information that would build the trust of the public. Presenting the research process in terms that are simple and transparent allows the public to more carefully assess the information’s validity and truthfulness.

Finally, experts may frame their research in ways that go against the norms of non-biased, independent research. They sometimes frame the research in terms of the goals and desired outcomes of their sponsoring advocacy group, or perhaps their own personal values and biases. These “value judgment” frames ultimately work to confirm preconceived notions of the desired policy alternative.

For information users: Those using and processing information from experts face a related, but somewhat different, set of framing issues. In many instances, users of information enter into a fact-finding or risk assessment process with a frame that implies that they already know all of the relevant facts. In these cases, such a “known facts” frame prevents the user from seeing the merit or validity of competing perspectives. If someone already has a clear picture of what valid and reliable facts “should” look like, then they will be likely to find fault with information that does not correspond to this preconceived image. In this way, the previous information constitutes a frame through which additional information is viewed and evaluated.

People adopting a “known facts” frame also have a picture of what credible and trustworthy information sources should be. In many environmental disputes, stakeholders have come to rely upon particular information providers, and respond to alternative sources with skepticism and mistrust. For example, information from well-known environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club or Greenpeace, may be believed, while facts from other, less well-known sources may not.

This phenomenon illustrates another type of framing, which hinges on individuals’ relative trust of science. Those adopting a trustful frame of scientific fact-finding tend to suspend judgment until the relevant facts have been collected and presented by independent or unbiased experts. They wait until scientific studies have been conducted, peer-reviewed, and presented to the public, before they decide how and why they will choose a particular course of action.

Other, more skeptical parties enter disputes with more rigid views of science and scientific facts. Regardless of the “facts” presented by assumedly credible and independent experts, those who are skeptical of science will only believe those facts that support their foregone conclusions. In essence, they already have their minds made up. These skeptics are distrustful of scientists and feel that their underlying values and interests in the dispute will necessarily skew their findings. In sum, individuals or groups evaluating scientific or technical information, who already have in their minds a picture of not only what the facts should look like, but also of how the fact-finders should behave, end up evaluating new and potentially contradictory evidence with a skeptical mind.

Additional Resources:

Lewicki, Roy J., Barbara Gray, and Michael Elliott. Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts: Concepts and Cases. Island Press, 2003.

Davis, Craig B. and Roy J. Lewicki. "Environmental Conflict Resolution: Framing and Intractability - An Introduction." Environmental Practice. Vol. 5, No. 3. September, 2003.

Kaufman, Sanda, Robert Gardner, and Guy Burgess. "Just the Facts, Please: Framing and Technical Information." Environmental Practice. Vol. 5, No. 3. September, 2003.

 


Also available: General Environmental Dispute Simulation

Copyright © 2003-2005 Environmental Framing Consortium

Please send comments and questions to


More detailed information, training opportunities, and information about our book,
Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts
, is available from the Consortium.