Fact Frames
People
approach conflicts in very different ways, depending on their images of
the relevant technical and social facts. For example, people who believe
that air pollution is killing them can be expected to act differently
from people who think that it is merely an unpleasant inconvenience. This
section, which will link closely with the fact-finding section, will examine
the psychological role of facts and factual interpretation.
All
individuals use frames to aid in deciding where and how they fit into
the conflict and what, if anything, they can do in response. Using the
metaphor of a picture frame, the "frame" concept acts as a device to
draw borders around what is and what is not important. Just as a picture frame
defines what is and what is not included in a picture, fact frames define
what is and what is not important to consider when evaluating information,
data, or facts about a particular dispute or policy alternative.
The Importance of Fact Frames
Because nearly every important
social conflict involves expert evaluation and opinion, the framing of
these facts deserves closer analysis. Facts do
not speak for themselves; without proper presentation and interpretation,
facts can leave one uncertain as to the meaning and significance of the
information. In many cases, preconceived notions of what is correct or
incorrect, factual or biased, objective or subjective, can cloud accurate
processing of relevant information. In addition, who is presenting the information can drastically
influence how the information is perceived, regardless of content.
Framing for Information
Producers and Users
Fact frames can be divided
into two categories: those of the information producers (scientists, data analysts,
technicians, engineers, professors, environmental risk assessment experts,
etc.), and those of the information users (lay public, politicians, conflict resolution
practitioners, educators, activists, policy-makers, etc.). Because of
their different societal and institutional roles, each party will
frame factual information in different ways.
Framing Problems
For information producers:
Because of their relationship to the data collection process itself, information
producers tend to frame the facts in specific ways. For example, since
many experts are so involved and entrenched in the information production
process, they often assume that all of the parties are aware of the practices
and procedures associated with that process. This assumption can lead information
producers to adopt an “expert only” frame, which makes it difficult to
transmit the larger meaning or significance of the produced information to a broader audience. Since
they know the minute details of the process used in the production of the information, they assume that
everyone else knows (or should know), as well. Therefore, in their communication
to others, they frame facts in ways that assume that everyone else knows what they
know.
An additional problem is associated
with trust and credibility. If experts frame information in ways that
assume that everyone is knowledgeable about their work, they may omit
essential information that would build the trust of the public. Presenting
the research process in terms that are simple and transparent allows the
public to more carefully assess the information’s validity and truthfulness.
Finally, experts may frame
their research in ways that go against the norms of non-biased, independent
research. They sometimes frame the research in terms of the goals
and desired outcomes of their sponsoring advocacy group, or perhaps their
own personal values and biases. These “value judgment” frames ultimately
work to confirm preconceived notions of the desired policy alternative.
For information users:
Those using and processing information from experts face a related, but
somewhat different, set of framing issues. In many instances, users of
information enter into a fact-finding or risk assessment process with a
frame that implies that they already know all of the relevant facts. In these
cases, such a “known facts” frame prevents the user from seeing the merit
or validity of competing perspectives. If someone already has a clear
picture of what valid and reliable facts “should” look like, then they will
be likely to find fault with information that does not correspond to this
preconceived image. In this way, the previous information constitutes
a frame through which additional information is viewed and evaluated.
People adopting a “known facts” frame also have a picture of what credible
and trustworthy information sources should be. In many environmental disputes,
stakeholders have come to rely upon particular information providers, and
respond to alternative sources with skepticism and mistrust. For example,
information from well-known environmental organizations, such as the Sierra
Club or Greenpeace, may be believed, while facts from other, less well-known
sources may not.
This phenomenon illustrates another type of framing, which hinges on individuals’
relative trust of science. Those adopting a trustful frame of scientific
fact-finding tend to suspend judgment until the relevant facts have been
collected and presented by independent or unbiased experts. They wait
until scientific studies have been conducted, peer-reviewed, and presented
to the public, before they decide how and why they will choose a particular
course of action.
Other,
more skeptical parties enter disputes with more rigid views of science and
scientific facts. Regardless of the “facts” presented by assumedly credible
and independent experts, those who are skeptical of science will only believe
those facts that support their foregone conclusions. In essence, they
already have their minds made up. These skeptics are distrustful of scientists
and feel that their underlying values and interests in the dispute will
necessarily skew their findings. In sum,
individuals or groups evaluating scientific or technical information, who
already have in their minds a picture of not only what the facts should
look like, but also of how the fact-finders should behave, end up evaluating
new and potentially contradictory
evidence with a skeptical mind.
Additional
Resources:
Lewicki, Roy J., Barbara
Gray, and Michael Elliott. Making
Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts: Concepts and Cases.
Island Press, 2003.
Davis, Craig B. and
Roy J. Lewicki. "Environmental Conflict Resolution: Framing and Intractability - An Introduction." Environmental
Practice. Vol. 5, No. 3. September, 2003.
Kaufman,
Sanda, Robert Gardner, and Guy Burgess. "Just the Facts, Please:
Framing and Technical Information." Environmental
Practice. Vol. 5, No. 3. September, 2003.
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