Although varying theories exist as to why conflict occurs and whether or not it is a natural condition of humankind, conflict is nevertheless an unavoidable part of the human experience. Given the differences in perceptions and socialization processes that exist both between individuals and cultures, conflict is inevitable. For their survival and stability all societies have devised mechanisms to deal with conflict when it arises. This paper will focus on political and social conflict in Taiwan and examine both historical and prevailing methods used for controlling conflict in that country. I will begin by presenting the realist, idealist, and world view paradigms of conflict. I will provide a brief outline of Taiwan’s recent political history as a background to understanding conflict in Taiwan’s political socialization process. Next, after describing a specific political conflict that occurred in Taiwan in May of 1991, I will analyze the cultural values and beliefs which influence the mechanisms that the Taiwanese chose for handling conflict. I will apply the above-mentioned conflict theories to the dynamics of the May, 1991 conflict. Finally, I will conclude by evaluating the relationship between freedom and security, together with the responsibility that freedom demands.

PARADIGMS OF CONFLICT

We begin our examination of the conflict resolution process by evaluating three different paradigms for perceiving the roots of conflict. Each conflict paradigm implicitly endorses different assumptions about the causes of conflict and whether or not conflict is an inherent part of human nature and society. These assumptions create radically different concepts and enlist entirely differing strategies as motivation for resolving social conflict.

The "Realist" Paradigm The first and predominant paradigm for perceiving conflict in the world today is the "realist" paradigm. This paradigm holds that human beings are innately aggressive and that the world is in a state of anarchy, a war of all against all, and motivated by self-interest. Accordingly, realists assume there is a scarcity of resources which tends to drive humankind to aggressive acts in order to acquire or protect these limited and desirable possessions. Realists reason that because human aggressiveness is inevitable, the only way to handle aggression is to be powerful enough to protect their own interests. For realists, power implies threatening to use force and if threat of force isn’t sufficient to protect the realists’ interests, they will indeed use force. Framing conflict in this manner frees the realist to acquire resources without concern for the impact these actions have on the economic conditions of others.
Defining conflict from the realist's paradigm uses the inductive approach as its methodology of research. From simple observation and direct experience, realists conclude the aggressiveness of man is a universal law of nature. The guarantor of validity for the realists is the widespread agreement between "experts." There are not enough resources to go around, so it's a matter of survival of the fittest, and the fittest are those who are powerful enough to protect their own interests. This perspective narrows the cause of conflict down to one single cause: man's inborn inherent aggressive nature.

The "Idealist" Paradigm

In this paradigm, conflict is not regarded as inborn, but rather as unnatural and dysfunctional. It is viewed as "a threat to systemic equilibrium." Since idealists believe that conflict is not innate and that social cooperation and consensus are natural, they set up as their first goal a world-order system of governance. In the idealist system, an international forum will handle conflicts and keep them under control by putting pressure on the participants to a conflict. This stratagem would, they believe, control conflicts.

Defining conflict from the idealist's paradigm also uses the inductive approach as its methodology of research. They optimistically conclude from simple observation and direct experience that social cooperation and consensus is a universal law of nature. For idealists, the guarantor of validity is widespread agreement between different observers. This perspective assumes the legitimacy of existing political and social systems. This assumption does not lead to uncovering causes of conflict or resolving underlying issues. The idealist paradigm relies upon the decision of an outside arbitrator or forum and the parties' voluntary compliance, upon threat of force, or the use of force. This method gives parties to the conflict no control over or responsibility for obtaining a decision that meets their own needs or interests. It relies upon the values of the arbitrator or forum making the decision, which does not necessarily represent the interest of the parties involved.

The World-Order Paradigm A third perspective is the "world order paradigm." The world order paradigm, like the realist, also regards conflict as natural, but assumes that it is something that develops within the social structure. For the world-order advocate, conflict is assumed to have social causes. It is perceived to be a indicator of the presence of an area of stress within society. From this perspective, inquiry is made into the underlying social dynamics and structural forces that give rise to the conflict. According to the world order view, conflict can be depicted through the analogy of a body pain that brings awareness that there is disease in need of healing. The pain of social conflict similarly allows us to be conscious of what isn't working. This perspective assumes that when the social causes of conflict are understood.
remedies can be found within the social structure. Defining the problem in this manner enables people, when the existing political process does not remedy social injustices, to take action to create social change in order to gain recognition and legitimization and a share of the economic resources to satisfy their human needs. 2

I view conflict from the world order perspective. This paradigm uses the systems approach as its methodology of research because determining the causes of the conflicts that arise over how economic resources should be distributed within society is a complex multicausal issue and it is difficult to isolate all the factors that contribute to the problem. The systems approach assumes that the properties or behavior of each element of a system affect the properties or behavior of the whole system. Systems thinking also assumes that each element in a system and the way it affects the whole is affected in turn by the behavior or property of at least one other element in the system. Since each element of a system has a nonindependent effect on the whole, a system can’t be understood by an independent study of its isolated elements. Therefore, a system synergistically is always more than the sum of its parts and will exhibit some properties or behaviors that none of its separated elements can. 3

What are the deficiencies of the realist and idealist paradigms?

In contrast to the world-order systems approach, the realist and idealist, by narrowing the problem down to one simple cause, fail to consider the larger contextual framework within which the problem exists. By identifying conflict as an aberration, the idealist fails to identify the cause of conflict. The realist’s perspective attempts to reduce complex social problems to simple a cause-effect relationship. Drawing the conclusion of the innate aggressiveness of man has been done without considering larger contextual factors such as social, political and economic systems, which create scarcity of basic needs. The realist does not consider what decisions are made that lead to how available resources are distributed. The realist does not investigate how human needs are defined that would lead to a conclusion that resources are scarce. The realist does not consider the social and cultural origins of the term "scarcity." Certain social ends are presupposed for these resources. These social ends define scarcity just as much as the lack of natural means to accomplish these ends. Many of the scarcities we experience, however, do not arise out of a lack in nature but are created by human activity and managed by social organization. 4 Defining the problem as a shortage of resources is a powerful ideological tool to persuade people to accept the status quo and the use of force to maintain it.

Both the idealist and the realist use the same inadequate tools in order to control conflict. They each threaten the use of force and will actually use force if necessary in order to exact
compliance from parties to a dispute. The idealist justifies the threat or use of force because the eruption of conflict is but an anomaly or an aberration, whereas the realist justifies the threat or use of force because human beings are innately aggressive. But although humans may be aggressive animals, its aggressive impulses may take on various forms, many of which are actually constructive. How our aggressions are expressed is a reflection of what we have learned through family, school, mass media, and other social constructions of reality. How we handle conflict is also a reflection of what our socialization process has been. Our political socialization is the most important conflict regulation device. On the one hand, human beings use their minds to create wars; on the other hand, they use their minds creatively to liberate humankind by creating institutions such as The League of Nations and The United Nations in an attempt to eliminate war.

What happens when inadequate conflict resolution paradigms and assumptions operate in the real world? When government, political institutions and our political processes do not remedy social injustices, recognition and legitimization of human needs can be gained through people taking action to create social change that will remedy existing injustices. It is such a situation that led to the political protests in May of 1991 in Taiwan. But before we get into those events, let’s first briefly explore the history of Taiwan’s political background in order to understand what led up to the events that occurred in May of 1991.

TAIWAN’S POLITICAL HISTORY

Taiwan’s political history illustrates the effects of the coercive suppression of social conflict. Taiwan was known for a long time for its economic dynamism and political stasis. But as a consequence of its rapid industrialization in the last three decades, Taiwan has been in the process of liberalizing its authoritarian form of government. The Koumintang (KMT) which is made up of the elite that emigrated from Mainland China, was the single political party that held power. The KMT has relied very little on democratic legitimacy in order to rule. It has maintained strict control over Taiwan’s economic, political, judicial and social systems, and only recently has a rival political party been tolerated.

The KMT attempted to suppress social conflict by maintaining their entrenched political dominance at the national level of government, while the popular electoral process was limited to local levels of government. The electoral system at the local level was initially installed by the emigrant regime as a means of assimilating native elite and emerging economic and social forces into the political system. Natives elected their representatives up to the provincial level and executive officials up to the county level. A complex local political machine was built on patron-client networks within the party structure with local factions competing for political power. Above the local level, the KMT controlled and demobilized the modern social sectors by preemptively incorporating business and professional associations, labor unions, state employees, journalists,
intellectuals, students and other groups. Few autonomous social forces escaped this authoritarian control.

The KMT's political power was maintained through the use of force and the threat of force. Only a few years ago incidents of organized protest where demands were made on the government were rare. But since the early 1980's the political climate on this island has changed dramatically and considerable social mobilization has occurred. Since then there have been increasing outbursts of social protests which have furthered the political transition from authoritarianism to democratization. This process involves an interaction between the ruling elite and the political opposition. As political opposition to the government has pushed forward, the state has retreated in its use of coercion in order for the KMT to retain its power. According to Yun-han Chu, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University, "the immediate cause of the upsurge of social protest in recent years is the perceived erosion of the willingness of the state elite to use coercive forces against political dissenting groups as well as ordinary citizens in open defiance of public authority."5

The KMT political leaders of Taiwan have overlayed their authoritarian rule with an ideological democratic facade. Though radically anti-communist, the KMT ideology has the flavor of socialism and the organization of the party apparatus, paradoxically, might fall along Leninist democratic centralist lines. Official ideology expounded Sun Yat-sen's eclectic 'Three Principles of the People'--nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood--which advocated the commensurate interests of the capitalist and working classes, the need for regulating private capital and the advancement of state capital. With its exclusive control over the socialization agents of society--the schools and mass media--the KMT created a popular coalition which indoctrinated people with the belief that the KMT embodied the interests of all classes. The KMT ruled under a highly restrictive political atmosphere. In the past very few segments of civil society escaped the immediate control of this authoritarian regime. Control was maintained through a powerful, pervasive security apparatus, which was reinforced by martial law. Under martial law, any public gathering was prohibited without advance government approval.

As mentioned above, the process of economic modernization has compelled the KMT to permit more conflict to surface. Rapid increase in industrialization and urbanization in Taiwan over the past few decades has stimulated social conflicts. New forms of production with the capitalist/worker relationship have stimulated social protests. The increased social density caused by urbanization has created conflict-prone changes. With the compacting together of people issues arise over distribution of available resources, communication, interdependence and the environment that lead to the eruption of social conflict. The unprogressive state structure has not provided the channels to
respond to these social conflicts. Without intermediaries in its structure to translate popular discontent into effective policy responses, the KMT regime has not been able to respond effectively to emerging popular demands.

Meanwhile, rapid urbanization, another symptom of modernization, increased education of people and a general rise in material well-being have led to a more articulate, self-assured and economically secure electorate. More and more activists have dared to test the permissible limits of public defiance, and opposition has dared to initiate a challenge to the legitimacy of the KMT regime. The KMT has been unable to prevent the accumulation of a backlog of popular discontent. The discontented have gradually become more activist and have engaged in contentious collective actions. These collective actions have taken the forms of citizen petitions, demonstrations, wildcat strikes, civil disobedience and riots. These actions have proliferated into a wide variety of issues over the island. Other than political opposition, most types of protest were initiated by ordinary citizens protesting issues related to their livelihood. Four major types of social protest have emerged in recent years: political, environmental, economic and labor. The demands and pressures placed on the KMT leadership have challenged the legitimacy of those in authority and have reinforced the process of democratization.

Pressures both within and without the ruling party have forced it to deal with demands for electoral openings at higher levels. Externally, diplomatic setbacks during the 1970s compelled the KMT ruling elite to become more responsive to rising popular demand for political opening. Taiwan lost its U.N. seat to mainland China, and with it lost its recognition by major allies. This international loss of face severely undermined the KMT’s claim to be the sole legitimate government of Mainland China. Also, peace overtures initiated by the Chinese Communists during this period and an emerging atmosphere of detente in the Taiwan Strait dispelled a previously-held siege mentality. Internally, repressive measures became increasingly costly for the ruling elite to suppress popularly elected opposition leaders.

For the opposition, the limited opening for national representatives provided the basis for the formation of a coalition of independent candidates with national political aims. Despite the government’s ban, the opposition moved cautiously towards forming a quasi-party and gradually increased their demands for democratic changes in ways that had never before been permitted. Finally just prior to the 1986 election, in defiance of the legal ban, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) declared its existence. The DPP, as a political party, has used the campaign process as a means of resocialization and fostering increased public demand for democratic legitimacy. The limited political opening which began in the early 1980s helped to loosen the KMT regime’s authoritarian grip on society and started the process of political liberalization and democratization in the early 1980s.
THE MAY, 1991 PROTEST MOVEMENT

On May 1, 1991 the regime’s authoritarian Period of Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellions, which had been in effect since 1947, was finally lifted. This statute was adopted as an emergency wartime provision during a time when Taiwan was in a civil war with mainland China communists. The law was initially aimed at preventing communist infiltration. Over the years the statute was given a wider authoritarian interpretation and used to crush dissidents and advocates of Taiwan independence. The statute was invoked to impose prison terms on members of the Chinese Communist Party and advocates of independence. The period of the 1950s is often referred to as the years of "white terror" when this statute legitimized random arrests and imprisonment without trial. The lifting of this repressive statute represents a softening of relations with mainland China, so erstwhile "communist bandits" are now labeled "communist Chinese authorities" or "Mainland authorities." 6

The Taiwan military, almost immediately after the president lifted the period of mobilization, imposed martial law on two of Taiwan’s offshore islands off mainland China’s Fukien Province. This action on the part of the military contradicted the president’s intent. The president’s action lifting the period of mobilization and ending the state of civil war was expected to ease political tensions in the Taiwan Strait and restore people’s constitutional rights.

The May, 1991 protest movement was triggered by four people becoming political martyrs. On May 9th, 1991, just one week after the Period of Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellions was lifted, four people were arrested on charges of sedition. The four were: Liao Wei-cheng, 25, a graduate student of history at National Tsing Hua University; Chen Cheng-jan, 32, an employee at a typesetting company; Wang Hsiu-hui, 32, a woman activist; and Lin Yin-fu, 30, a worker at a Presbyterian-run fishermen’s services center. They were all alleged to have been active in student and other social movements in the past several years. Under Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Regulations Governing Seditious Activities, "those attempting to sabotage the national system, steal national territory, or use unlawful means to change the national constitution and overthrow the government" face punishment by death. 7 Correspondence and taped telephone conversations, books and records about the independence movement and the history of Taiwan were accumulated as evidence that the four people were members of a secret seditious group that had the goal of establishing Taiwan independence. They were accused of undergoing training in Japan to overthrow the Taiwan government. Each of the four acknowledged they had met a man in Japan by the name of Shih Ming.

Shih Ming was born in Taipei, went to school in Japan, and came back to Taiwan where he promoted Taiwan independence. He eventually returned to Japan where he runs a restaurant. He is on the wanted list of the Taiwan’s prosecutor’s office for promoting
Taiwan independence and for allegedly having started the "Independent Taiwan Association (ITA)."

The four who were arrested each acknowledged they had received money from Shih Ming, but stated it had been given to them to compensate for the cost of their airfare to Japan. They each denied having tried to recruit members or to expand ITA in Taiwan. The four each had visited Shih Ming separately, were arrested separately, and apparently did not know each other prior to the arrests.

As mentioned previously, at the time of these arrests on Thursday, May 9th, 1991, the Period of Mobilization for Suppression of Communist Rebellions had been lifted, but the law governing sedition were still in force and had not yet been revised. The Investigation Bureau said it was still "determined to crack down on Taiwan independence activities which 'use democracy as a cover.'"

A student-initiated mobilization process began. Students responded to the arrest of the Taing Hua graduate student by charging that the authorities were launching political persecution. At Taing Hua and National Taiwan universities, professors suspended classes and students boycotted classes and organized a campus sit-in and protest outside the Government Information Office and legislative buildings the afternoon of the arrests. And because he was not informed of the arrest beforehand, the president of Taing Hua University wrote a letter to the Justice Ministry objecting to the inappropriate manner in which Liao was taken into custody.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the political opposition to the ruling Kuomintang party, came to the support of the four arrested suspects making demands that they be released following questioning. They were initially unsuccessful, however, in their attempts to obtain their release on bail. Other civic groups mobilized and came to the support of the four political prisoners and opposition coalitions were built. Groups staged sit-down protests in front of the Taipei Ministry of Justice office on Friday, May 10th, protesting the government's illegal arrests and re-imposition of "white terror." The groups included various Taiwan university student unions, The Urban-Rural Mission, the Northern Taiwan Political Prisoners Victimization Association, Taiwan Aboriginal Rights Association, Taiwan Labor Movement Association, and the Taiwan Cultural Promotion Association. Approximately 100 UCLA Alumni in Taiwan petitioned the authorities to release fellow UCLA Alumni Chen Cheng-yan immediately. The DPP opposition party formed an ad-hoc group to defend the four. Through this mobilizing and coalition building a power base was built.

On Sunday, approximately 100 Taiwan university students, professors and sympathizers staged an unauthorized protest at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Plaza, demanding the immediate release of the four charged with sedition. After failing to persuade
protestors to voluntarily leave, about 400 riot policemen charged
the protesters and forcibly dragged them out of the Plaza, put
them into buses, and drove them to three different locations.
After they were released, the protesters returned to the Plaza
where they were again dispersed, but during a scuffle that ensued
people were arrested. National Taiwan University's Professor Chen
Shih-meng later said he was dragged inside Chiang Kai-shek
Memorial Hall and seriously beaten in the head and groin.
Thereafter a sit-in was staged overnight at National Taiwan
University. The following day the student body of National Taiwan
University's College of Law protested the kicking and beating of
students and teachers by riot police the day before at the Chiang
Kai-shek Plaza protest.

"In order to pacify the voice of protest," on May 11 the
Deputy Director of The Ministry of Justice offered to resign.9
The Director-General of the National Police Administration warned
that students and professors must apply for a permit in advance of
staging marches or force would be used to disperse them. The
district police chief justified the necessity to forcibly clear
the grounds of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall because
well-known instigators had been spotted among the demonstrators.
He denied, however, that this action involved the beating of
demonstrators.

Responses by government legislatures were varied. Huang
Chu-wen phrased the arrest of Liao as "legal but inappropriate." Wu Haïen Erh, of the KMT, said, "The government should make it
clear to the people that advocating Taiwan independence will not
be tolerated." Yu Mu-ming also of the KMT accused the young
people of being "ignorant of what democracy is."10 Concern was
voiced by other legislators over the possible infringement upon
academic freedom, and members of the Control Yuan voted to conduct
an inquiry into the circumstances of the arrest of the four
suspects.

The offered resignation of the Deputy Investigation Bureau
Director in an attempt to placate the students did not calm the
storm of dissent. More than a token resignation was needed to
resolve the conflict. Students became more confrontational. They
escalated their protest activities beyond their original demand
for the release of the four to demands for policy changes that
would increase political freedom. They charged the authorities
with launching political persecution. They stated that people
have the right to freedom of speech and that security forces
should not arrest those who promote Taiwan Independence in theory
only. The protestors also demanded the resignation of other
Cabinet members as well as the Director General of the National
Police Administration for the beating of students and professors
at Chiang Kai-shek Plaza In addition, demands were made for the
withdrawal of military, police and intelligence presence on
college campuses, for the release of secret files kept on students
and professors, for the abolition of Article 100 of the Criminal
Code, and other laws that suppress the expression of public
opinion.
On May 15th, more than 1,500 people began a week-long sit-in at the Taipei Railway Station. Students from the National Student Movement Alliance (NSMA) and from some 20 universities and colleges all over the island boycotted classes and joined the railway station protests. Other groups joining the protest representing various aspects of society included: intellectual associations, political groups, religious organizations such as the Yushan Theological Seminary of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church, women's groups, major colleges and universities, a coalition of aborigines and a group of former political prisoners. The students were not dispersed by police and they remained overnight.

The issue of abolishing the sedition statute was raised within the Legislature. On May 17th, after the ruling party (KMT) and government legislature met in an emergency meeting and reached agreement, the Executive Yuan announced its approval of the abolishment of the Statute for the Punishment of Sedition. However, the Executive Yuan also qualified its announcement by stating that in the interest of maintaining national security such acts as working to destroy the nation, illegally changing the constitution, or other acts aimed at toppling the government would still be punished under the Republic of China's Criminal Code. A KMT official also stated that abolishment of the statute does not mean that the KMT has made any concessions to the protesters.

The three men and one woman suspected of sedition were released on bail on May 17th after the Prosecutor's Office stated it had completed its investigation of the case. The Prosecutor decided to indict the four on charges of attempted sedition under Article II of the Statute for Punishment of Sedition in spite of the fact that this Statute was nullified the day before by the Legislative Yuan. He stated that it would be up to the judge to decide which law to apply because the sedition law is still effective until the president promulgates a decree to terminate the law. The Prosecutor denied that political pressure had any bearing on their release.

Student protests continued. On May 18th, protestors attempted without success to speak directly to Premier Hau Pei-taun at the Executive Yuan and the Cabinet. On May 19th they rallied outside the Premier's residence in suburban Taipei to protest his refusal to talk directly with them about their demands. Students also marched to the Education Ministry and to the Taiwan Television headquarters in protest of unfair reporting of their activities. They delivered written petitions and some students threw eggs. Here at the Education Ministry, the students objected to military and police force presence on campus. They also asked to meet face-to-face with Education Minister Mao Kao-wen. When told the education minister was not present, they sat down in front of the building and shouted slogans demanding that Premier Hau resign and then left their written petition with ministry officials.
On May 19th the conflict escalated as approximately 100 students and professors from National Chiao Tung and National Tsing Hwa Universities staged a rally at the Investigation Bureau and increased their demands. They protested Investigation Bureau agents collecting information on campuses. They wanted the government to abolish the Military Training Office, which is responsible for disciplining students in schools. They also wanted the Second Personnel Office (SPO), which spies in government offices, closed and the security records compiled by it destroyed. The Bureau's director, Wu Tung-ming, accepted a written protest but denied that the bureau had sent agents to the school to supervise students' actions. He also denied that the Bureau investigates and keeps records on students and professors. The protestors did not accept his denial. They refused his request to enter the building and enter into discussion, and continued their protest for another hour.

The Taipei City Police Department approved a request to demonstrate by the "Intellectuals Against Political Persecution Federation," while turning down a similar request by the opposition party (DPP), stating that it would tie up traffic if both groups were allowed to demonstrate on the same day and on the same route. However, the Police Bureau stated that it would not interfere if the Federation allowed the DPP and its supporters to join its demonstration.

On May 20th protesters--students, professors, intellectuals, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party and various social action groups--staged a massive demonstration and marched through the downtown streets of Taipei. The number of people estimated to have participated in the march ranged from 7,000 to more than 30,000--depending upon the source. After the demonstration, students stayed overnight without police harassment outside the Legislative Yuan, or Parliament, where they made demands for the abrogation of an article that punishes sedition. Approximately 400 students continued protesting the next morning and marched in the vicinity of the Parliament. They blocked traffic and disregarded police warnings that they had overstayed the demonstration curfew of 6:00 p.m. the previous day.

The protestors represented a minority of Taiwan's population. The majority of the public did not respond openly to the conflict. But choosing not to respond is also a response. It gave implicit consent and legitimacy to those holding power in government.

Having surveyed the historical dimensions of this Taiwanese social protest movement, let us now proceed to analyze how conflict is viewed in Taiwan and how it is controlled through the process of socialization.

TAIWANESE CONFLICT CONTROL THROUGH SOCIALIZATION

Inevitably, the culture within which we live shapes and limits our imaginations, and by permitting us to do and think and
feel in certain ways makes it increasingly unlikely or impossible that we should do or think or feel in ways that are contradictory or tangential to it. 11

How we handle conflict is a reflection of what we have learned from our culture and through our socialization process with family, school, the mass media, etc. Our process of socialization is the most important conflict regulation device in society. Our values, belief systems, and ideology influence the particular methods we chose to resolve human conflicts.

Traditional Chinese relationships are hierarchical and authoritarian. Equality is a Western concept. Ancient Chinese rules of behavior called "li" prescribed the norms for proper behavior. Originally "li" were enforced by social sanction and later by legal sanction. Confucius stressed that obedience to parents was the basis of all morality and filial piety the most important of all virtues. Parents, by giving us life, gave us our being, and are accordingly more important than a spouse. They also have more experience in the world, so it is natural that they are more knowledgeable than we are. Advanced age is equivalent to advanced knowledge; therefore elders deserve total respect and obedience. Thus Chinese parents had almost absolute power over their children. Their wishes and dictates were always to be obeyed and their memory to be cherished after they die; thus the existence of ancestor worship as a state religion. "In the eyes of their descendants the dead are extremely reluctant to give up their authority and never relinquish all of it." 12 And in order to carry on the family name one should have male heirs. Each person was expected to fill his or her role in order to have no reason to bring shame on one's family.

This century in Taiwan traditional Chinese values have undergone deep changes. Out of military defeats came a re-evaluation of old Chinese culture and the building of a new set of values suitable to new times. This new ideology was inspired by Western culture and blended a mixture of old and new values. The weakness seen in Confucianism was the omission of social obligation towards strangers and those social relationships outside the family. Chiang Kai-shek and his wife sponsored the "New Life Movement" 13 in order to inculcate patriotism in the citizen. In this movement nationalism and Confucian discipline and devotion to the family were combined in an attempt to create national unity. Strong points of the old system such as discipline, and mutual help were retained, but the overall trend was liberal and progressive and essentially remolded the Chinese family on a Western pattern. Equality of women was advocated, as well as freedom in the selection of mates, abolition of polygamy, educating children to be independent, more commradely relations between parents and children, and the adoption of the conjugal family (while still insisting on proper care for old parents). In spite of the modernization of relationships, over the long term, leaders--the politicians, teachers, intellectuals, etc.--still turn to the Chinese classical tradition, the old
established way of doing things, to create order in their world.

The organization of Taiwan’s state power parallels its internal family social structure. Taiwan’s government parallels the tradition of the old hierarchial and authoritarian Chinese social structure. The Kuomintang rules the country as a result of winning the revolution. Therefore, as with the child who owes his parents everything for giving him life, the citizenry owe the government everything. Government controls all aspects of their lives—homes, businesses, land—and the citizenry are not entitled to self-determination. Servicemen are stationed in schools as military instructors. They are responsible for military training courses and also exercise disciplinary power over students. No criticism of the government should be tolerated. “High position equals high morality in the traditional Chinese concept. Therefore the leader, by definition, "does not make mistakes." Questioning a leader’s policies, decisions, or strategies is equivalent to questioning his ability to lead. Challenging the leader would cause a loss to his image as a leader.

To the extent that a person can keep up the appearance of fulfilling one’s role in front of a group, even though it may be a false image, one has face. Losing this image means losing face. Thus talking down to someone or pointing out their faults, especially in front of others (but also if expressed privately) causes loss of face. Directly rebutting someone’s statement or claim or pointing out a discrepancy between what they say and what they do could also cause loss of face. And “Chinese people do not like to say ‘no.’”15 Putting someone in the position of having to say no, will make that person lose face. Chinese people therefore try to find more diplomatic and tactful ways to express the negative. This can lead to great circumlocution.

Harmony is an underlying premise of Chinese social structure. Social relations tend to stress harmony that is achieved by active avoidance of conflict. In a dispute one remains pleasant, uncritical, calm and undisturbed, and does not express anger. When there is a conflict of interest, expressing sympathy for the other person’s position is a good way to begin a discussion about the matter. The search for truth and debate between different points of view are not part of Chinese tradition. “Chinese would rather be all wrong in a harmonious fashion than all right in a non-harmonious one.” A popular Chinese idiom is "wei chu chiou chuan" which means that we should make great concessions in order to accommodate a situation.”

Custom and tradition are more important than legal standards. Thus, conducting oneself in a proper manner and saving face for everybody involved in a dispute is much more important than determining each party’s legal position. Pinning responsibility onto one person rather than everyone sharing in the consequences is a Western individualistic response which is equated with selfishness. Group mentality requires that the single party or smaller group acquiesce to the demands of the
larger group. Where the Westerner would approach a dispute by searching for the equity in the situation, the Chinese would replace this with a direct request for sympathy and favoritism or, if the situation is complicated, would make such requests indirectly. The outcome will tilt in favor of whichever side is more able to convince that sympathy should be extended to them, unless the other side is in a more powerful position.

In his book, Harmony in Conflict, Richard Hartzell contrasts Western and Chinese views on liability in conflicts of interest. He calls Western logic, "whither-from reasoning" because it starts with a past cause, assigns responsibility, holds individuals accountable, and blames individuals for their actions. He identifies Chinese logic in a conflict-of-interest situation as "whither-to reasoning" because there is no past. It starts with the present and moves to a future solution in which blame is spread among many.

BELIEF SYSTEM INFLUENCES ON THE MAY, 1991 CONFLICT

To learn the lesson of effective conflict resolution and to examine differing paradigms of conflict resolution, let us now evaluate how the conflict was perceived by both the Taiwanese people who chose not to respond to the conflict and the actual parties to the conflict, because it is their perceptions that influenced the strategies that were chosen as motivation for resolving the conflict.

The lack of open response by the majority of the Taiwanese people to the political events of May, 1991 fits the idealist paradigm of conflict. The idealists view conflict as unnatural and a threat to systemic equilibrium. They believe that social cooperation and consensus are natural. In the idealist system, an international forum handles conflict and keeps it under control by putting pressure on the participants to a conflict. The legitimacy of existing political and social systems is assumed. In our May, 1991 demonstration case, the Taiwanese majority, by not involving themselves in the conflict, gave legitimacy to the existing political and social systems. The perspective of the majority of nonresponsive Taiwanese reflects Taiwan's hierarchical social structure in which the legitimate authority of parents is unquestioned.

The responses of the authoritarian KMT to the political events of May, 1991 fit the realist paradigm. Like the realist, the KMT has concluded that the only way to handle aggression is to be powerful enough to protect its own interests by the threat of and use of force. The KMT has therefore ruled Taiwan with an iron hand. It has used force and the threat of force in order to maintain its control. Its power has been maintained through a pervasive security apparatus and reinforced by martial law. The president declared an end to the Period of Mobilization, but the military and judicial systems continued to function under the same repressive laws because they had not been changed. The military imposed martial law on two of Taiwan's offshore islands off
mainland China’s Fukien Province and the prosecutor’s office, still determined to crack down on Taiwan independence activities, arrested the four on charges of sedition.

The actions of the protestors in the May 1991 conflict fit the world order paradigm. Conflict from the world order perspective assumes that conflict has social causes. It is perceived to be a indicator of the presence of an area of stress within society. From the world order perspective, inquiry is made into the underlying dynamics and structural forces that give rise to the conflict. The protestors, by objecting to the arrest of the four on charges of sedition and confronting the government with demands for academic freedom of speech, brought awareness to the contradiction between the rhetoric of the president in his declaration that the Period of Mobilization had been lifted, while accompanying laws were not changed and the military and judicial systems continued to function under the restrictive laws. Like the world order paradigm follows, the protestors considered the larger system or contextual framework within which the problem existed. When the protestors recognized the contradiction between the rhetoric and actions within the existing political process, they took action in order to gain recognition and legitimization for freedom of speech.

TECHNIQUES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT

We referred at the beginning of this paper to mechanisms for dealing with conflict. Techniques for resolving conflict can be placed in three major categories based on whether the dispute-solving process is unilateral, bilateral or trilateral. Unilateral conflict solving techniques include lumping, avoidance, coercion, and self-help. By definition, lumping means that an aggrieved party takes no action. Avoidance signifies that a party withdraws from the conflict. Coercion employs force to exact compliance. Self-help means that the aggrieved party takes the matter into his or her own hands. Bilateral conflict resolution involves negotiation. Here the goals is "...not to reach a solution in terms of rules, but to create the rules by which to organize a relationship. 18 Trilateral conflict resolution includes arbitration and adjudication. Arbitration involves the rendering of a decision by a third party with the consent of the parties involved in the dispute. Adjudication also refers to rendering of a decision by a third party, but in this case by a person or forum with the authority to intervene without the consent of the parties and has power to enforce any decision that is made.

TECHNIQUES USED IN RESPONSE TO THE MAY, 1991 CONFLICT

Now let us examine how these various techniques of responding to conflict were employed in the May, 1991, conflict in Taiwan. I will divide the various types of responses into categories: unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral.

Unilateral Responses:
When the police ignored the fact that protestors illegally remained overnight at the railway station and did not disperse them, they were engaged in lumping. They took no action.

The noninvolvement of the majority of the Taiwanese people was an avoidance of conflict. The Investigation Bureau chief's denial of charges of spying made by students against the Bureau was another example of conflict avoidance. And when both government representatives and protestors refused to talk with their opposition, they were using avoidance.

The arrests of the four charged with sedition by the Investigation Bureau were acts of coercion. The Director-General of the National Police Administration used coercion when he threatened to use force to disperse students and professors if they did not apply for a permit prior to staging protests. Government used coercion again when the Taipei City Police Department turned down one group's request to demonstrate while granting the request of another group. Students also used coercion when they threw eggs at a building during a protest.

The Taiwanese protestors engaged in numerous self-help activities. They mobilized fellow students and university faculty, organized campus sit-ins and protests in public places and government offices, and left written petitions with ministry officials. The mobilization of other civic groups when they came to the support of the four political prisoners and the building of coalitions were also self-help activities which built a power base. Protestors utilized self-help and took the law into their own hands when they blocked traffic and disregarded police warnings.

Bilateral Responses:

The Deputy Director of the Ministry of Justice's offering to the protestors that he would resign was an act of negotiating. Even if the action was only to placate the protestors, it reached beyond the previously existing relationship in order to find a resolution. The legislature's approval of abolishing the sedition statute involved negotiating between political factions.

Trilateral Responses:

I did not see any forms of arbitration, where a third party renders a decision with the consent of the parties involved in the dispute occurring in this conflict.

Adjudication occurred when the legislature appointed a legislative committee to conduct an inquiry into the legitimacy of the arrest of the four. The committee members who were appointed intervened and rendered a decision without the consent of the parties. A judge rendering a decision of whether or not the four
were guilty of sedition is another instance of adjudication.

The majority of the activities engaged in during the political conflict in May, 1991 consisted of the use of unilateral techniques on the part of the protestors. Historically the ruling party, the Kuomintang, had also used unilateral techniques in order to control social conflict. It had relied upon the legitimacy of government to use force and responded to social conflict with coercion. It had not provided the structures by which to respond effectively to emerging popular demands.

Successful negotiation requires that each party to the dispute acknowledge a relationship between equals. When one party to a conflict does not recognize the grievances of the other, the parties are not meeting as equals and mediation will not work. The protestors had to first equalize their relationship. In order to accomplish this, they resorted to self help and took the law into their own hands. The government then began to recognize and respond to their grievances.

IMPACT OF THE PROTESTS & RESOLUTIONS

The conflict that occurred in May, 1991 originated over the protests of university students and faculty in order to prevent encroachment on independent campus academic activities. This conflict was triggered by the discrepancy between the rhetoric of the president and the contradictory law and actions of the military and judicial systems. The "Statute for Informing Against and Eradication of Communist Bandit Spies during the Period of Communist Rebellion," the law that allowed authorities to suppress freedom of speech and to jail dissidents without trial, was eventually abolished. An ad hoc committee composed of vice ministers of all eight ministries was formed to review national security, demonstration, and public assembly laws which had been instituted under the "Period of Communist Rebellion."

An additional after effect of the scrapping of the "Statute for the Punishment of Sedition was that the legislature proposed that the president pardon and restore the civil rights or reduce the sentences of people who had been imprisoned under the sedition law that was repealed.

People can still be prosecuted for activities such as working to destroy the nation, illegally changing the constitution or other acts aimed at toppling the government, but they will now be prosecuted under the Section100 of Taiwan’s Criminal Code. Under this section of the Code, "those who attempt to sabotage the national system or steal national territory will be punished as seditionists. 19

But what exactly is an "attempt to sabotage?" Democratic countries have rules regarding who should be considered seditionists. Generally, those who use violence to steal national territory or to overthrow the government are regarded as seditionists. The protestors only raised the issue of the right
to discuss Taiwan independence academically and as a theoretical consideration. They did not directly confront the issue of whether advocating Taiwan independence or advocating a position that would lead to Taiwan independence should be considered a seditious act. Thus, the right to freedom of speech for the general public was never addressed. The step has yet to be taken of drawing the line between advocating an independent Taiwan, which is an expression of free speech, and actually engaging in activities which seek to overthrow the government by force.

CONCLUSION

My initial reaction to seeing the control in Taiwan’s social and political systems was to compare it to my own social and political background and to see the Taiwanese system as controlled and my Western system as free. But upon further reflection I became aware of the same forces of control, though more subtle, at work in my own culture and in my own life. I came to realize that there is no abstract ultimate freedom, only freedom from something towards something.

There is also no abstract ultimate harmony. We experience conflict in our external world among our relationships with others because we are inevitably confronted by different perceptions, needs, wants, and desires. And we also experience conflict internally as we are confronted by contrary tensions, simultaneous yearnings for both freedom and security. We want to feel safe, protected, and taken care of, while at the same time we want the freedom to express our own unique selves. But "...freedom entails inescapable risk, just as security entails inescapable curtailing of freedom." 20 (Mark Sommer, p257) We yearn to take the risks that freedom requires, but we so often don’t have the courage to act. The potential impact of our actions seem too insignificant to risk the attempt to make a difference. We perceive ourselves as helpless to create any meaningful change.

But the actions of one person do make a difference. They give courage to the next person, and when joined with others, the actions of a relatively few who are willing to take risks do create a new reality. The people who protested in Taiwan in May of 1991 demonstrate the power of a few to effect change. A small proportion of Taiwanese people were willing to take risks for their beliefs and joined together in common action with others and created an alternative reality. They broke the silence of society’s and government’s engineered consensus. They exposed the reality of government actions carried on behind a screen of rhetoric about democracy. Using only the strength of their own convictions, they faced an authoritarian regime that historically has openly used violence in order to maintain its power. When protestors defied authority, the regime backed down in its use of force to maintain power. The actions of a few created conflict. Conflict led to movement. And out of the movement came a little more freedom. Yet there is still much more that needs to be changed.

It is difficult to find the time and energy to take on the
responsibilities required in order to be free. It is much easier to leave decisions in the hands of others. Nonaction is understandable; we want to feel safe and secure. But we lose our freedom because we allow it to be taken from us. "...a free society requires much more of its citizens than does a dictatorship. It demands personal responsibility, voluntary self restraint, and active participation in the community."21 (Mark Sommer, P258).

21 Ibid, p. 258.