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International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict |
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, USA |
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The "scale-up problem" is another limit to negotiated agreement, and is closely linked to the EATNA limit (expected alternatives to a negotiated agreement). Often in interorganizational, intergroup, or international negotiations, the negotiators do not have final authority to accept an agreement. They negotiate on behalf of other people--government leaders or citizens, business owners or CEOs (chief executive officers) or union members, for example. Often, the negotiators will have a transformative experience that occurs through participation in the negotiation process itself. They will come to recognize the legitimacy of the opponent's positions, interests, and needs, and will develop a respect for the opponent that their constituency often does not have. This causes the negotiators to make concessions that may not be approved of or agreed to by the constituents. Yet it is the constituents, ultimately, that must often ratify the agreement.
Like the EATNA limit, the scale-up problem often leads to a last minute breakdown of negotiated settlements, as the negotiators are unable to "scale up" their transformation to their constituents, and hence are unable to get the constituents to agree that the final settlement is a good one. Thus, there is a tendency for constituents to reject the negotiated settlement--and the negotiators--and turn to their EATNA, if they do not understand how the negotiated agreement is superior to their expected alternative.
In past writing we have referred to this phenomenon as the "mirage effect." Agreement often appears as a mirage--a shimmering image just off in the distance. Yet just as a mirage disappears as one approaches it, so often do negotiated agreements which fall victim to EATNA and scale-up problems.
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