Working Paper 94-60 February 1994
By Alexandra L. Davis
This paper was written in conjunction with the Fall 1993 Natural Resources and Environmental Policy Seminar of the University of Colorado Interdisciplinary Graduate Certificate Program in Environmental Policy. All ideas presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Consortium or the University. For more information, contact the Conflict Resolution Consortium, Campus Box 327, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0327. Phone: (303) 492-1635, e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
© 1994. Alexandra L. Davis. Do not reprint without permission.
In December of 1992, disaster was splashed across the front pages of the Rocky Mountain News and the Denver Post. An open pit mine located in the middle of a national forest had been abandoned by the operator leaving behind miles of cyanide contaminated streams and a host of other contamination problems. The Summitville Mine will probably become one of the most studied cases of what can go wrong at a mine site. A great many things went wrong at Summitville. However, Summitville has left in its wake a new Mine Land Reclamation Law with more realistic and stricter controls on mining operations. The process to the new legislation, led by the Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Board, was historic. Environmental, Industry and State representatives hammered out a bill that passed the Colorado Legislature unanimously.
Part one of this paper deal with the mine site itself, and its history. Part two describes the open pit mining operation. Part three discusses the negotiation process of new legislation, I focus on the key components that led to success in this instance. Information about the process came from interviews with one environmental, one industry and one state representative each of whom played key roles in the negotiation process.
The Summitville Mine, located on patented and unpatented mining claims within the Rio Grande National Forest, is in an historic mining district above the San Luis Valley in south-central Colorado. The elevation of the mine is between 11,400 and 12,500 feet. Timberline is between 11,700 and 12,000 feet. The mine is situated upon the upper reaches of the Wightman Fork and Cropsy Creek watersheds. The Cropsy Creek drainage between South Mountain and Cropsy Mountain generally marks the southern and eastern extent of the Summitville Mine area. Wightman Fork flows easterly through the valley bottom to its confluence with the Alamosa River some four miles downstream. Terrace Reservoir is located about 13 miles downstream from the Wightman Fork/Alamosa River confluence. The Alamosa River is tributary to the Rio Grande River system.(1) (See Figure 1)
The primary environmental impact of the mining operation is on the adjacent surface and ground water systems. The ground water flow direction in the South Mountain area appears to be north-northeast towards Wightman Fork. Two historic tunnels, the Iowa and the Reynolds, drain water from the mine site. The Iowa Tunnel drains a portion of the east side of South Mountain. The Reynolds Tunnel influences ground water flows and appears to drain the pit area and the northeast side of South Mountain. Shallow ground water surfaces in numerous seeps around the Iowa and Reynolds tunnel portals.(2).
Placer and lode mining in the Summitville mining district began as early as 1870.Underground mining methods were used in the district from 1870 to 1984. Mining activity was intermittent, the most productive periods occurring from 1875 to 1887, 1926 to 1929; and 1934 to 1944. From 1984 to 1991, open pit mining techniques were used.
Sulfate and acidic water quality conditions were identified as early as 1917 in three tributaries to the Alamosa River; Alum, Iron and Bitter Creeks. These creeks are all upstream from the Wightman Fork confluence. There is no evidence of mining in these drainages.(3)
In 1934, a 100 ton-per-day flotation/cyanidation mill was installed. In the mid-30's dewatering filtrate from the flotation circuit was discharged directly to Wightman Fork. While the flotation/cyanide mill was active, water quality in the Alamosa River was reportedly impacted by Alum, Bitter and Iron Creeks to such an extent that the additional impact from Wightman Fork was not considered important.(4)
Activity in the late forties recorded that rail and air lines in the Reynolds Tunnel were in constant need of replacement due to acidic water deterioration. A mine inspector in 1949 observed the rapid deterioration; noting, for example, that a bridle for a rail switch was reduced to paper thinness in three weeks from action of the acidic water.(5)
Through the sixties and seventies, activity was limited to exploration. In July of 1984, Galactic Resources, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Galactic Resources Ltd. of British Columbia, Canada, leased the Summitville property from Reynolds Mining Company. Summitville Consolidated Mining Company, Inc. (SCMCI), a subsidiary of Galactic Resources, Inc., was the operator of record from 1984 until December of 1992.
Water quality degradation in the Alamosa River due to elevated metal concentration in Iron, Bitter, and Alum Creeks was recorded as far back as the early 1900's. In 1964, Forest Service reports noted the absence of a viable fishery in the Alamosa River.(6) Water quality in Wightman Fork and the Alamosa River downstream from the Wightman Fork confluence has degraded further since the early 1980's. Since the onset of open pit mining, metal loading in the Wightman Fork drainage has increased by orders of magnitude.(7). As the Wightman Fork watershed accounts for about 15% of the Terrace Reservoir drainage area, there as been concurrent decrease in pH levels and increase in heavy metals in the Terrace Reservoir water.
The two primary regulatory agencies overseeing Summitville Mine activities from 1984 to December, 1992 were the Mined Land Reclamation Division (MLRD) of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources (CDNR), and the Water Quality Control Division (WQCD) of the Colorado Department of Health.(8). The MLRD and the WQCD administer and enforce state law. The WQCD administers EPA delegated Clean Water Act programs, including aquifer protection and National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) programs. The Mined Land Reclamation Board (the Board) is the governing body of the MLRD and responsible for promulgating rules the MLRD administers and enforces. The Board's responsibilities include approving mining permits, ensuring existence of adequate reclamation plans and bonds, determining the existence of violations and assessing financial penalties for those violations.
Because the majority of the mine is on patented claims, the Board took the lead role in permitting pursuant to the Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act of 1976. The U.S. Forest Service had limited involvement because of the small number of unpatented claims within the mine site. Their responsibilities were primarily associated with access roads and exploration programs beyond the limits of the patented claim boundary.(9)
In 1984, after conducting pilot-scale cyanide heap leach tests, SCMCI applied for a permit to operate an open pit mine and heap leach pad. The MLRB issued the permit in October of 1984.(10) Open pit mining began in 1986, after the initial phase of leach pad construction was completed. The pit currently covers most of the historic underground workings and is approximately 73 acres large. Ore production and pad loading continued until October of 1991.(11).
The leach pad authorized by SCMCI's original permit was designed as a compartmentalized pad with a maximum heap height of 60 feet. In June of 1986, this design was modified to a single cell pad with a maximum heap height of 300 feet. Although warned of the risks associated with winter construction, SCMCI continued leach pad construction in early 1986. In March and April of 1986, the pad liners were damaged by avalanches. In May portions of the synthetic liner were certified, excluded were areas that were covered by snow and those areas damaged by avalanches. The record does not show that any follow-up certification was provided.(12)
The site was inspected by MLRD in April and May of 1986. Pad loading commenced in May of 1986. MLRD jurisdiction encompasses the mine operator's ability to reclaim the leach pad.(13)
On June 10, 1986, five days after onset of leach solution application, cyanide solution was detected beneath the primary liner. June 18, 1986, an MLRD inspection detected cyanide beneath the secondary liner. July 11, 1986, cyanide was first detected in the drain solution below the pad. Technical response was focused in sump and pumpback solution recovery systems. Solution recovered could be pumped either to the treatment plant or back onto the heap. No evidence was found citing attempts to repair the liner leak.(14) Between June and October of 1987, nine cyanide spills occurred from the drain sump and pumpback system. The spills resulted in the discharge of 85,000 gallons of cyanide- contaminated water into Cropsy Creek. These spills were caused by either pump or pipeline failures.(15) Enforcement action was taken by both WQCD and the MLRD. In 1991, two more cyanide spills occurred, and two seeps were discovered in the dikes constructed to contain the leach pad. A third seep was discovered in April of 1992. March 31, 1992, SCMCI terminated cyanide solution application to the leach pad.
The SCMCI leach pad and solution management ponds were originally permitted to be zero discharge facilities. The leach pad was originally designed for minimal solution accumulation within the pad basin. Due to unanticipated problems in the pad operations, allowable discharges, climatic conditions, seepage and leaks resulting in water having to be pumped back onto the pad, there was almost immediately a significant imbalance in the amounts of water retained and the amounts discharged. This led to an SCMCI application for a discharge permit, under the Colorado Pollutant Discharge System, to release treated water from the heap leach pad.(16) Inability to meet the permit discharge criteria, required contaminated water to be pumped back onto the pad and exacerbated the problem. Water balance was revised in February and April of 1988 because annual precipitation exceeded evaporation.(17) Water balance has been a chronic issue for solution management at Summitville.
Because the water treatment plan was unable to meet the effluent limitations imposed by the discharge permit, the SCMCI turned to land application of the treated process solutions as a method of disposal. Land application was not considered a point source discharge, consequently only MLRB permitting was required. However, a July 1990 WQCD inspection found the land applications system malfunctioning with resultant overland flow directly into Wightman Fork. Point source discharges from seeps and waste rock were also cited.(18)
The South Cropsy waste area is in the original Cropsy Creek drainage just upgradient from the leach pad. A ditch routes runoff and subsurface seepage from between the drainage and the waste area and leach facilities. The ditch empties into Cropsy Creek.
Contrary to normal requirements, SCMCI constructed the disposal area and then submitted design and operation documents to the MLRB for approval. This action was a violation of permit conditions and resulted in enforcement action by the MLRD.(19) The records are unclear as to when acidic seepage was first observed form the South Cropsy waste area. The first action was in June of 1991, when SCMCI applied for a discharge permit. An interim water treatment facility was constructed between the waste area and the leach pad. By August, 1991, the treated seepage from the waste area could not meet effluent limitations for discharge into the ditch. The seepage was diverted onto the leach pad for on-site containment. The seepage has typically been acid; copper and iron are primary elements of concern from this drainage.(20)
In Mid-1990, the EPA received anonymous telephone calls concerning unpermitted discharges occurring at the Summitville site. After a September, 1990 inspection, the EPA informed the State of Colorado that if it did not take enforcement actions, the EPA would. Both the WQCD and the MLRD took enforcement actions in February, 1991. Land application was discontinued on October 31, 1991.
Following cessation of mining in October, 1991, some reclamation occurred. The South Cropsy waste area was regraded, topsoiled and seeded. In the summer of 1992, detoxification of cyanide in the heap began. Reclamation work on the mine and waste disposal areas continued during that summer. By the end of 1992, 144 acres of the 631 disturbed had been reclaimed and seeded.(21)
During SCMCI's time on-site, numerous enforcement actions were brought against SCMCI by MLRD and WQCD. The MLRB issued violations in June, 1986; November, 1987; February, 1991; October, 1991; and August, 1992. Penalties assessed by the MLRB exceeded $61,850. Compliance problems in 1990 and 1991, led to development of a Settlement Agreement and Compliance Plan in July of 1991 among SCMCI, MLRD and WQCD.
The original permit required a reclamation bond of $1,304,509, to cover costs for surface grading and shaping, clay caps on waste rock and heap residue, and revegatation. Reclamation law at the time did not establish bonding authority for water treatment or heap detoxification. In 1989, an additional surety of $913,801 was required by the MLRB, which included costs for a one-time detoxification rinse. The bond still excluded cost for water treatment. As problems mounted, the Board became suspicious that significant modifications would be required in the reclamation plan and requested and additional $5,000,000 bond. Upon the completion of site grading and commenced operation of a Portable Interim Treatment System in November 1992, SCMCI gained release of $2,500,000 of the bond.
Along with acid water drainage problems, pre-SCMCI disturbances included historic mine waste disposal areas and exploration roads. Figure 2 demonstrates the difference in disturbance before and after 1984.
Acid drainage flows from the Iowa Tunnel into the pit. The Reynolds tunnel is approximately 400' below the bottom of the Summitville pit. Although, the Reynolds Tunnel discharge was acidic before open pit mining, flow rates and metal loading discharge have increased since open pit mining began. SCMCI has contended from the outset of the project that there was not a hydraulic connection between the pit and the Reynolds Tunnel, however, this does not seem to be the case.(22)
The leaks and spills from the mining operation, increases in discharges and metal loading from the Reynolds Tunnel have affected the quality of Wightman Fork. The effects include elevated cyanide concentrations and acid pH water downstream of the site. In 1990, increased cyanide concentrations were detected at several surface water monitoring locations, including Wightman Fork, Reynolds Tunnel, and Cropsy Creek below the heap. Water quality samples taken upstream and downstream of the Summitville mine indicated noticeable reductions in pH and increases in metal concentrations downstream from the mine. Much of the differences in water quality between the upstream and downstream locations can be attributed to untreated Reynolds discharge.(23)
Although upstream of the Wightman Fork, the Alamosa River, influenced by Alum, Bitter and Iron Creeks has typically been acidic, the disturbing and dangerous trend is the dramatic rise in copper levels downstream of the Wightman Fork confluence. Water, soil and sediment studies conducted in 1991 and 1992 show a pronounced increase in dissolved copper compared to studies conducted in 1972 and 1986.(24) The Terrace Reservoir, on the Alamosa, has been stocked with fish between 1953 and 1990. In March of 1990, live fish were identified below the ice in the reservoir. On June 9, 1990 a fish kill occurred in a farm pond that had obtained water from the Terrace Reservoir. In response, the Colorado Department of Wildlife inventoried the Terrace Reservoir fish population by electroshocking in July of 1990. No fish were recovered.(25)
On December 4, 1992, SCMCI declared bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of U.S. Bankruptcy laws, stating it was not financially capable of reclaiming the site to the level agreed upon in settlement agreements. The State of Colorado requested the EPA to take control of the Summitville site under the emergency response provisions of CERCLA. Despite a court injunction ordering SCMCI not to abandon the site, SCMCI abandoned the site at midnight on December 15, 1992. The EPA assumed management responsibility on December 16, 1992. The EPA is attempting to obtain "superfund" status for the Summitville Mine Site and related property.(26)
The bankruptcy and ensuing EPA takeover shocked the people of the state of Colorado. "Summitville" became synonymous with disaster. The press had a field day, printing several straight days of front page headline stories. Interesting was the fact that the newspapers concentrated on the cyanide contamination. Cyanide is a short range problem. It evaporates from water within a 2-3 miles.(27) While it is certainly a problem for those miles, the serious contamination is from heavy metal loading. Another aspect glossed over in the papers was the level of heavy metal contamination that existed naturally and from historic mining. The effect, however, was immediate and strong public pressure on the State to do something.
The disaster resulting from the regulation, oversight and enforcement problems at the Summitville mine prompted an immediate move to change the Mined Land Reclamation Act and accompanying administrative rules. As indicated above, the problem was not lax enforcement policies by the MLRD. The MLRD had cited and fined SCMCI for numerous violations. The problems were several; First, the authorities granted to the MLRD were narrowly focused on reclamation. For example, the Board could issue a permit requiring certain standards required in reclamation of the leach pad, but did not have the authority to ensure (i.e. through permitting of production processes) that the operation would in fact be able to meet those standards.(28) Most important were the lack of authority in bonding and emergency response actions. Lack of sufficient authority emasculated regulations important to the job of overseeing and enforcing state reclamation standards for mining operations.(29) Second, in March 1987, the Colorado legislature passed a budget cut that substantially reduced the administrative and enforcement abilities of the MLRD.(30) The budget cut decreased the staff from fifteen full time employees to six, affecting dramatically the inspection frequency and over-supervision capabilities of the MLRB.(31)
In January 1993, Ken Salazar, Executive Director of the CDNR, proposed 18 changes to the Mined Land Reclamation Act relating to the review and permitting of metal mining operation that use chemical processing. The Board organized a committee of representatives from the Mining Industry and Environmental groups to meet with State representatives, discuss Salazar's proposals and develop legislation. The group met intensively 2-3 times a week until April, 1993.
The key aspects that led to successful and meaningful legislation were the political environment, cohesive and similar goals, trust amongst disparate groups, the ability to compromise and the leadership of the Board.
All sides agreed that the driving force was the public pressure on the Governor's office to act. The Colorado government was suffering a political black eye. In the Board's view, Summitville was a catalyst. The Board had been struggling with the inadequate rules for some time, compiling a list of issues requiring legislative and administrative change.(32) They were open to and ready for change.
In the environmentalists view, Summitville was a golden opportunity. In their experience, the Colorado Legislature had traditionally been hostile to environmental regulation. Now the State itself was proposing the change. Representative Tilly Bishop had agreed to sponsor legislation, with the caveat that all problems be ironed out before. He did not want to get into a legislative fight. The Board also knew from experience that fighting issues, like the ones presented by Summitville, on the Congressional floor was a much longer, less productive battle.(33). Thus, for environmental groups, it was not the usual scenario of ramrodding environmental legislation through a recalcitrant legislature.
All three of the negotiators noted the importance of having essentially the same goal; prevention of another Summitville disaster. Summitville focused attention on two of the biggest problems; bonding and lack of emergency response authority. The group had to ensure adequate authority to address various problems that had been developing over the last several years.(34) The Board had the opportunity to clarify its role and authorities. Environmentalists had the opportunity to ensure stronger reclamation standards. Industry agreed that change was necessary. They also wanted to show the public that most mining operations are responsible and do not operate in the rogue manner of SCMCI. One of the underlying attitudes that made some of the negotiations difficult was the environmentalist view that all mine sites were potential Summitvilles. Out of approximately 2,000 mine permits, 2-3 mines are of the type and size that could cause Summitville like problems.(35)
There was also cohesion within the represented groups. There was little contention amongst the environmental groups because there was general agreement as to what needed to happen.(36) It was evident to all in the mining industry the change was necessary.(37) The Board was tired of trying to operate with inadequate authority.(38) This is not to say debate was not contentious or heated, because it was. The ability to bypass the difficult question of what the objective is and begin with the question of how to achieve it helped the group avoid ideological marshes of, for example, whether mining should be occurring at all.
Traditionally environmental groups and the mining industry have confronted each other with thoroughly opposing views. In Colorado, however, for two years prior, Industry, State and Environmental representatives had been working together to develop state ground water standards. A level of trust already existed between the two opposing sides. Industry and environmental representatives had discovered they could sit, talk and trade proposals. As one source said, "Once you get over the stereotypes, you can talk."(39)
Industry was sincere in its belief that no one wins from a situation like Summitville.(40) Industry wanted to protect itself from overzealous reaction and they were willing to work with environmentalists to do so. The lead negotiators for industry were deal makers, they were not hard liners. Environmentalists felt industry had come to the table in a good faith effort to create change.(41). All three members expressed their belief that this trust existed and was crucial in allowing compromise to occur. Neither environmental nor industry representatives felt bound to maintain a hard line stance. The Board felt everyone's agenda's were on the table. This paved the way for true discussion about how to address the issues. No one had to posture, or maintain a particular stance. Polarization of issues was avoided.
Still some of the difficult areas were apparent in the different approaches.(42) Environmentalists, some felt, argued from an emotional view. Their ultimate goal was a "just say no" clause. Industry argued from a more scientific view, they wanted a clear checklist of what was expected from them. They wanted to ensure that mining would continue. There were some problems of credibility such as accepting each other's data. Suspicion lingered as to credibility of scientists from both sides. The Board, in the middle, was often able to appease both sides, i.e. through providing independent data.(43)
Industry felt a good deal of the success lay in the ability of the Board, particularly the two lead members, Luke Danielson and Maxine Gilbert, to summarizing the two disparate views and creating a middle ground that both sides could accept.(44) Part of acceptance lay in knowledge that the negotiations were not open- ended. If there could be no agreement, final authority rested in the Board. The Board consists of seven persons representing industry, state, and public interests. Because of this composition and the fact that the State's views lay in between the environmentalists and industry, whether the Board would agree with one side or the other was often "a flip of a coin."(45) If one of the other two groups really wanted to oppose a position, it would entail taking the issue to the floor of the legislature and then perhaps to court. The Board members proved to be essential mediators.
One of the most interesting and perhaps unusual aspects of the negotiation process was the ability to compromise. Frequently, one group would refuse to budge at first, yet they always would in the end. Except once, an environmental representative refused to move from his position, Industry offered three different compromises and he still refused. The issue went to the Board, at the last minute the representative got cold feet and compromise was reached.(46) The key here appears to be resting final authority in a relatively objective participant.
The negotiations were also run with two specific rules; (1) if the group became deadlocked, they would move to something else and return to the difficult issue later and (2) the group could not launch into wholesale reform, they had to concentrate on defining and addressing those areas that led to Summitville. The narrow focus of correcting those problems to prevent another Summitville was important, and combined with cohesive objectives left little room for extraneous arguments.
On April 26, 1993, Senate Bill 247 passed unanimously out of the Colorado Legislature.(47). Important changes in the new law include requirement of an Environmental Protection Plan for all operations that use or produce toxic or hazardous materials, generate acid mine drainage or have a high potential for release of contaminants; MLRB authority to amend existing operating permits and mandate compliance with updated environmental and reclamation requirements; MLRB authority to extend permit application reviews; increased certification requirements; strengthened bonding authority, including stronger limitations on bond instruments; increased permit and annual fees; and authority for an emergency response fund and state intervention in emergencies.
Both sides agreed that the battle is not over. In order to reach agreement, a number of issues found contentious in the drafting process were deliberately left nebulous in the final legislation. A safety net existed for both sides in the knowledge that negotiations would continue in the rulemaking process. Although many details will be worked out in the rule- making, there is no question the Mined Land Reclamation Act of 1993 is far more powerful from a regulatory standpoint than the previous law.
The most unfortunate aspect was that it took a crisis to really act on issues that people recognized had existed for some time. Although both the environmental and industry representatives expressed their beliefs that the process would have occurred anyway,(48) it is undesirable that without the crisis, the problems may have continued for several years.
Still, the response offers a positive model for others to follow. The important components to successful policy making in this instance included; strong leadership, clear and narrow goals shared at some level by all negotiators, some modicum of trust and comfort with persons representing opposing sides, competent objective mediators, final authority in one group- preferably the middle group, and the ability to defer some issues- to find a measure of agreement to build on later.
(1) Chronologic Site History, Summitville Mine, Volume I, Knight Piesold and Co., p.11, 1993
(2) Site History, supra, n.1, p.13
(3) Site History, supra, n.1, p.16
(4) Geology and Ore Deposits of the Summitville District San Juan Mountains, Colorado, Steven, T.A., Ratte, J.C., U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper No. 343, 1960.
(6) Alamosa River Stream Improvement, Greene, A.F.C., U.S. Forest Service, July 15, 1964.
(7) Site History, supra, n.1, p.43
(8) The MLRD changed its name to the Division of Minerals and Geology on July 1, 1992, for purposes of this paper, I will continue to refer to the MLRD.
(9) Site History, supra, n.1, p.10.
(10) Colorado MLRB chronological summary of events, 1993.
(11) Site History, supra, n.1, p.22.
(12) Site History, supra, n.1, p.28
(14) Id., p.29.
(15) CDNR, Colorado MLRD records, Summitville, 1993
(16) Site History, supra, n.1, p.35.
(17) Id., p.38
(19) Colorado MLRB Chronological Summary of Events, 1993
(20) Site History, p.34.
(21) Id., p.22.
(22) Id., p.25.
(23) Id., p.45-47.
(24) Draft Water, Sediment and Soil Quality Synopsis and Literature Review Alamosa River, Conejos County, Colorado, Agro Engineering, December 29, 1992.
(25) Site History, supra, n.1, p.49.
(26) Id., p.52-3.
(27) Interview with Summitville Site EPA Employee, September, 1993.
(28) Interview with Maxine Gilbert, Chairwoman, MLRB, November 16, 1993.
(29) Interview with Kit Kimball, industry negotiator, November 11, 1993.
(30) One source at the EPA felt this cut was in response to a concurrent attempt to develop a mine waste regulatory program under the Resource Conservation and Recover Act. It was thought that the Legislature assumed because a committee had been formed to develop such a program, the federal government was going to concern itself with regulation of mining operations and thus Colorado did not have to expend as much money. This may just be an opinion. Interview with R.W. EPA, Region 8, Office of Solid Waste, November 4, 1993.
(31) Interview with Roger Flynn, environmental negotiator, October 27, 1993.
(32) Gilbert Interview, supra, n.28
(33) Gilbert Interview, supra, n. 28.
(34) Kimball Interview, supra, n.29.
(35) Gilbert Interview, supra, n.28
(36) Flynn Interview, supra, n.32.
(37) Kimball interview, supra n.29
(38) Gilbert Interview, supra, n.28.
(39) Flynn Interview, supra, n.32.
(40) Kimball interview, supra, n.29.
(41) Flynn interview, supra, n.32.
(42) Gilbert interview, supra, n.28.
(43) Gilbert Interview, supra, n.28.
(44) Kimball interview, supra, n.29.
(45) Gilbert interview, supra, n.28.
(46) Gilbert interview, supra, n.28.
(47)Kimball interview, supra, n.29.
(48) Kimball interview, supra, n.29; Flynn interview, supra, n.32.